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Summary 
 
Who:  Pratt & ‘Whitney (United Technologies) 
International Association of Machinists  
Local Lodge 971 
 
Where: West Palm Beach, Florida, 
  Military Jet Engines and Space Sector 
 
When:  First Visit:  April 1999 
  Second Visit:  October 25-26, 1999 
 
Why:    Strategic Organizational Change and Funding 
 
What:  Closing of military jet engine side of the facility  
and lay off of workers 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Key Challenges and Key Lessons Learned 
 
The central challenge facing this facility changed dramatically on 
August 12, 1999.  Instead of the challenges of labor management 
partnership and continuous improvement, the focus shifted to core 
questions of business strategy and job security when United 
Technologies announced that it was closing the military jet engine 
business at West Palm Beach and reducing its total workforce by 1500 
people.  Ongoing cost reductions and the need to be leaner were cited 
as the reasons for this action.  Louis R. Chenevert, Pratt and Whitney 
president explained, 
 
We’ve made considerable progress transforming Pratt into a 
lean organization, reducing costs and improving our ability to 
respond to customers.  However, we see continuing 
competitive pressures, which make it critical that we eliminate 
excess floor space and more closely match our cost structure to 
changing business conditions.  As part of United Technologies’ 
overall restructuring initiative, we have an exceptional 
opportunity to further reduce costs and streamline operations at 
Pratt1 
 
Such organizational instability has been a threat for some time at the 
facility.  In an effort to improve the plant’s performance and viability, 
management and labor had jointly been developing and implementing 
a high involvement work process.  The process was an extensive effort 
initiated by managers and union officials at the facility.  Unfortunately, 
it never achieved sustained commitment and support from either the 
International Association of Machinists (IAM) or United 
Technologies/Pratt and Whitney at the highest levels. 
 
According to Jim Wilkinson, Materials Services Operations Manager 
at West Palm Beach, the early management champions of the initiative 
left the company for retirement or new jobs, and the process became 
solely driven from the bottom up.  This bottom up approach is very 
risky in a company where the principles of labor management 
teamwork are not firmly embedded in the culture. 
 
It appears that the leadership at the corporate level was aware of the 
activity, but they may have been unclear about what might be gained 
from the systematic involvement of employees and employee 
representatives in the operation of the facility.  Local champions took a 
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1 Press release:  Pratt & Whitney, East Hartford, Connecticut, August 12, 1999; Mark 
Sullivan, contact person. 
cautious approach and wanted to make sure the initiative would be 
successful before they shared much detail with their corporate officers.  
The lack of clearly defined and measurable benefits made it difficult 
for facility advocates of the process to convince others of its value.  
This made those working on the plan overly cautious which slowed the 
process of implementation.  
Ultimately results of the initiative 
came along too slowly to influence 
corporate policy. Among the lessons 
Jim Wilkinson highlighted is the idea 
that they should have moved forward 
more quickly and fixed some things 
later rather than wait to make the plan 
perfect. 
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2 According to Local 971 president David Straig
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Additionally, the space propulsion sector working in the facility will 
remain for now, but there are rumors of a Pratt acquisition of a 
California-based firm.  The future is not set for this unit.3  Jack 
Franklin, a methods engineer in the propulsion area, explained that this 
unit was separated from engines in an earlier restructuring.  When that 
separation occurred, people began increasing their flexibility by 
learning a wider range of skills and creating a dedicated flow of 
materials through their section.   
 
Summary of Types of Instability 
 
Organizational instability is the key type of instability facing this 
facility.  United Technologies/Pratt and Whitney are facing potential 
economic constraints with the decline in military spending coupled 
with increased competitive pressures.  One response to these 
constraints is a general reduction in costs 
through a consolidation of operations, and a 
reduction in capital outlay through the 
reduction of facilities.   
 
Corporate leadership appears to have had 
some ambivalence about the ongoing utility 
of the West Palm facility.  There was 
uncertainty about what where the best uses for the facility and its 
highly trained workforce.  West Palm Beach was originally established 
in 1958 as a research and development center in a location that 
allowed for high degrees of secrecy.  Cutting edge engines were 
designed and tested here (the SR-71 Blackbird, the R-15, the F-16. and 
the current F-22).  Employment rose to 8,300 employees in 1989 but 
has declined 88% since that time.4  The decline in employment reflects 
the decline in U.S. military budgets as well as increased competition 
from other engine manufacturers such as General Electric and Rolls 
Royce.  We were told that it would be highly unlikely for the firm to 
develop another new engine design unless it could collaborate with 
others to help ameliorate the high costs of this type of development.5 
Pratt and Whitney’s 
strategy for the West 
Palm facility appears to 
have shifted over time… 
 
Pratt and Whitney’s strategy for the West Palm facility appears to have 
shifted over time from its beginnings as a research and design facility 
                                                 
3 Stephen Pounds, West Palm Beach Post, August 13, 1999, 41 years of history end 
as aerospace giant leaves.  From Internet www.gofbi.com/news/1999/-
8/13/pratt/html. 
4 Ibid. 
5 In fact, Pratt and Whitney has announce a joint venture with GE in Europe called 
the Engine Alliance.  The goal of this joint venture is to develop an engine for the 
super jumbo airbus.  From the Commission of the European Communities, Press 
release, September 15, 1999.  Reference number:  IP/99/684.  Subject:  Competition 
Policy-Transport Main. 
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to a 1994 proposal to combine Florida and Connecticut engineering 
staffs through a most recent attempt to shift some production to the 
facility.  Comments by members of the West Palm Beach workforce 
indicated that they believed that the decision makers in Connecticut 
considered West Palm to be a ‘retirement assignment’ for executives.  
In fact, the facility may have been seen as less dynamic due to the 
nature of its research and development mission.  Additionally, the 
facility was reported to have a great deal of autonomy.  In 1994, when 
Karl Krepack took over the presidency of Pratt and Whitney, he began 
an integration process that included linking information and other 
production related systems throughout the company.   
 
The subsequent introduction of production work into this facility was a 
radical change in culture and included the need to 
reduce the opportunities for individual highly skilled 
workers to use those skills in their daily tasks.  It flew 
in the face of what the workforce perceived as the 
traditional split of primary tasks between their R and D 
role and the production role of other facilities.  
Workers were asked to broaden the span of the 
narrowly defined job classifications that they had 
previously gained through collective bargaining.   The company and 
the union at West Palm were working through a very intricate pattern 
of contractual relationships in an effort to link the greater flexibility 
needed to meet competitive challenges with compensation and 
employee skill development.  This was a slow process but many 
employees were finding it rewarding.  One tool and die maker, Bob 
Gotsell, told us that he’s hoping to relocate to Connecticut and try and 
take some of this involvement process with him.  Though he is still 
trying to make sense of the announcement, he said, “I know that we 
will lose the ability to do what we do here, but I’ll support it the whole 
way.  Here you felt like you owned the business.  Now you can’t 
figure out what you did wrong.” 
“Here you felt like 
you owned the 
business.  Now 
you can’t figure 
out what you did 
wrong.” 
 
Summary of Mitigation Strategies 
 
In 1995, Jim Wilkinson and Larry Richards, two SBU managers, 
collaborated to investigate the possibility of a more cooperative 
relationship with the workforce.  They had been dissatisfied with how 
they perceived the interests of their business units had been 
represented during collective bargaining.  With the assistance of a 
change agent from UTC’s flexible manufacturing team, Alden Davis, 
management decided to move forward with a plan to reduce or adjust 
job descriptions.  The union needed to be involved.  Jeff Hopkins, 
West Palm Human Resources Manager and one of those involved in 
the initiative from the beginning, indicated that getting the union 
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involved was possible because the level of trust was higher in Florida 
than in some other parts of the organization.    
 
The initial joint group participated in team building exercises led by 
Alden Davis.  Out of these early-shared experiences, the group 
developed enough understanding to agree to a feasibility study and a 
benchmarking trip that took them to four widely diverse sites.  Three 
of the sites were in the industry and produced weapons or related 
products.   The fourth organization was the New Haven Symphony 
where, after the musicians had gone on strike and been locked out, a 
joint team was able to put together a contract.  From this base of 
shared experience, the West Palm team created a mission statement 
and made plans to go forward. 
 
These early fact-finding efforts eventually evolved into an agreement 
with the union to develop a high involvement initiative.  In January of 
1996, exploratory language, Letter 29, was developed after a one-week 
offsite.  Jeff Hopkins recalled that Bill Lefco and Larry Richards wrote 
the initial “strawman” language during a phone call.  This original 
language was modified and included in the collective bargaining 
agreement (see Appendix).  This led to the joint development of a 
carefully devised plan for the change initiative.  Joint committees were 
set up to create implementation designs for the process.   
 
The initiative called for the formation of a leaner, team-based work 
organization system with attention to skill development, 
compensation, job preservation and work design.  A committee was 
created to work on each of these four elements of the initiative.  It 
speaks volumes for the local union that not only did local members 
ratify the contract containing Letter 29 in January 1996, but also local 
members ratified the processes and their implementation again on 
February 22, 1998.  The goals of the initiative were to improve quality, 
increase job flexibility, and improve employee skill levels.  As the 
result of doing these things, the West Palm Beach facility has become 
the “site of choice for growth within Pratt and Whitney.6 
 
Although the bargaining unit voted on the plan and reportedly 
supported it by a large margin, there was less direct support from 
managers both inside and outside the facility.  Pratt and Whitney still 
had not made a decision about the future of the facility.  Many hoped 
that successful implementation of the plan would lead to cost savings 
and other innovative changes that would persuade the corporate office 
to maintain and expand work in the facility.  
 
                                                 
6 Taken from Letter 29 materials received from both union and management at West 
Palm Beach. 
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Managers within the facility were not receiving much encouragement 
for their efforts in the initiative, and they were frustrated with the slow 
pace that often accompanies a joint effort.  A main procedural point 
was the agreement that decision-making in the Core Team or 
leadership group was by consensus.  This type of decision-making 
rests in a trust relationship that must be built and maintained.  A 
number of small setbacks made trust building a very slow process.  A 
vicious cycle developed.  People became frustrated at the slow process 
and decided that attending meetings was a waste of time.  Then, as 
attendance became sporadic, it became more and more difficult to 
reach any decisions, which then fed into a spiral of frustration over the 
slow progress.  The lack of progress in implementing the plan was a 
deep source of disappointment.  Dave Straight, president of IAM Local 
Lodge 971, expressed this best when he said, “My biggest heart ache is 
that I would have given anything to have that plan work somewhere.” 
 
Multiple agendas surfaced within those working on the planning, 
which made the progress seem even slower.  Dave Straight recounted 
one specific example from the introduction of a new turbine exhaust 
product.  The product was new and production facilities were 
‘greenfield,’ so it seemed the perfect place to introduce the processes 
from the labor/management initiative.  There were only four 
machinists involved so it was not practical to create a new job 
classification.  The introduction became a “total nightmare” when 
union people working on the process made promises linked to money.  
Expectations were raised among the people in the unit that they would 
be paid more for learning additional skills to allow job rotation and a 
different work design.  Those union representatives had a separate 
agenda that linked all cooperative efforts to pay increases.  When this 
did not occur, the people in the unit felt deceived. 
 
Although the complete labor/management plan was never fully 
implemented, at least one production cell had been designed and put in 
operation using the process.  The workers can do any job in the cell, 
which raised concerns among the workers who worried about the 
crossing of crafts as “a sheet metal worker did press work.”  The plan 
was most fully implemented among the members of the Test Area 
Work Team.  One important note is that this team is to remain on site 
after much of the work leaves this facility.  It is unclear whether they 
will continue to implement the provisions of Letter 29.  According to 
Dave Leibeck, a local IAM representative, it is, however, possible to 
see fragmented pieces of the process all over the plant. 
 
Workers explained dilemmas they faced in trying to reduce costs.  For 
example, they had responsibility for only 30% of the nozzle for the F-
22 engine.  Outside vendors who were not prime contracts do not have 
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to maintain the same level of redundancy that prime contractors do.  
Department of Defense requirements for prime contractors mandate a 
series of checks on product quality and cost effectiveness that are not 
extended to outside contractors.  As such, the cost reduction 
opportunities are constrained or require links out into the supply chain. 
 
During the period that the initiative was being developed, there were 
constant concerns that the facility would be closed.  
Paul Strang, an IAM Business Representative from the 
West Palm Beach Local Lodge, told us how local 
union officers tried to rally support for their efforts 
from local business groups as well as country and state 
politicians.  These efforts were not as successful as 
they would have liked since Pratt and Whitney’s 
Connecticut offices would not acknowledge any plans to move or 
reduce the size of the facility even after requests by the governor.7 
 
Local union 
officers tried to 
rally support 
for their 
efforts… 
Local public officials were hopeful that some change in the company’s 
plans might be forthcoming after they learned of a letter, dated August 
4, 1999, to Pratt from Air Force. Lt. Col. Gail C. Allen, that detailed 
the Pentagon’s concerns about whether moving the work out of Florida 
would “compromise Pratt’s performance on some military programs.”8  
Of special concern was the work on the new joint strike fighter.   
 
A representative from U.S. Representative Mark Foley’s office 
reported that they had hoped that the Air Force concerns might provide 
some leverage to keep Pratt in the area.  Union officials will have 
found this concern too little and too late.  At a much earlier date, they 
had approached Representative Foley and asked him to help them in 
their efforts to keep Pratt in West Palm Beach.  His lack of 
responsiveness generated the display of “Impeach Foley” bumper 
stickers on a number of cars driven by IAM members. 
 
Pratt apparently addressed the military’s concerns adequately because 
the U.S. Defense Logistics Office announced that the “company has 
assured the military that its concerns are going to be addressed.”  
Company spokesperson Mark Sullivan reported that Pratt “went to the 
highest levels to assure the military the move to Connecticut would be 
                                                 
7 Associated Press Story, Naples Daily News, August 11, 1999, Officials scramble to 
stop Pratt & Whitney from leaving Florida, 
http://www.naplesnews.com/today/business/d304917a.html.  The county and state 
were hit twice as they learned that the Sikorsky Aircraft facility located next to the 
Pratt and Whitney site is also to be closed laying off 520 employees. 
8 Ibid.  
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flawless and seamless.”9  Certainly it is in Pratt’ interest to protect the 
$1.9 billion in business the company does with the government each 
year. 
 
 
 
 
Additional Observations Framing the Case 
 
A number of factors may well have influenced the situation at Pratt 
and Whitney West Palm Beach.  It is unclear what if any impact the 
following had on the eventual outcome.  Nonetheless they have been 
identified by people at the facility or by the authors of this case as 
potentially influencing the relationship and the course of events.  The 
first of these factors is the long-term history of labor relations distrust 
between the company and the IAM.  This relationship was particularly 
fierce between the parties at the Connecticut headquarters location, 
although the company made no attempt to hide its desire to be non-
union.  Such traditional antagonisms shape the relationship between 
the workforce and management by creating distrust and a general 
unwillingness to cooperate with each other.  In Florida, the 
relationship appears to have been less negative.  Certainly the parties 
were able to work through many issues and build a mutually respectful 
collaboration. 
 
For the international union this situation was a dilemma.  Members 
would be affected no matter how the experiment in West Palm Beach 
turned out.  It must have been difficult for long-term union leaders to 
place any trust in an initiative that included managers from a company 
with whom they had long had serious disputes.  It is also frequently 
very hard for union leaders to understand how non-traditional 
initiatives that involve collaboration with management could ever 
work to the benefit of the membership.  Years of collective bargaining 
experience have often reinforced distrust of leaders on both sides of 
the bargaining table. 
 
However the transfer of knowledge and information happened, and 
subsequent negotiations in East Hartford led to the implementation of 
similar language as that which had been developed in West Palm.  
Since the more traditional labor management relationship in 
Connecticut did not contain the same levels of trust that had been built 
in Florida, we would anticipate a different set of outcomes. 
 
                                                 
9 S. Pounds, West Palm Beach Post, August 14, 1999, Government won’t block Pratt 
and Whitney’s planned move, from 
http://www.gopbi.com/news/1999/08/14/pratt.html 
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The local in East Hartford is much larger and represents many more 
workers than the local in West Palm Beach.  The Connecticut local 
also had a pool of laid off people who needed work.  It is entirely 
understandable for a local union to do what it can to try and return its 
members to the workforce.  Unfortunately, union members in West 
Palm Beach believed that the international union sacrificed them since 
they were the smaller, and therefore electorally less powerful group.   
Traditionally, however, if jobs are to be lost, unions will try to serve 
the greater good even if it must be at the expense of the smaller 
number.   
 
One larger economic factor has surfaced in the form of suppositions by 
many people concerning economic pressures on the parent company. 
United Technologies Incorporated, Pratt and Whitney’s parent 
company, recently sold its automotive parts unit, and the losses from 
this restructuring action would offset the capital gains from the sale.  
In addition, closing the facility is estimated to save between $50 
million to $100 million in overhead.  These financial incentives match 
current needs as Pratt has suffered several competitive setbacks such 
as the recent failure of a bid to supply commercial engines to Boeing’s 
77 aircraft.10  
                        
An internal issue at this site, albeit not directly with the IAM local, 
may have been the pending potential certification of a union for the 
engineers at this facility by the Florida 
Professional Association.  There had already been 
one vote in 1997 when the ballots were sealed after 
a legal challenge from corporate management.  A 
second vote was held in May of 1999.  Karl 
Krapeck, who had just been appointed COO of 
United Technologies from his post as president of 
Pratt and Whitney, issued a statement prior to the 
election which many felt linked the outcome of the 
vote to decisions about the future of the facility.  
The engineers voted not to affiliate.   
 
Final Reflections 
 
A number of points in this case can be taken away as lessons to be 
used by others as they attempt to make a transition to greater joint 
operations and implementation of network systems.  The clearest of 
these lessons is the need for strong leadership and support for the 
process at the highest levels of the organizations involves whether the 
The clearest of these 
lessons is the need for 
strong leadership and 
support for the process 
at the highest levels of 
the organizations 
involved whether the 
initiative starts bottom 
up or top down.   
                                                 
10 S. Pounds, West Palm Beach Post, August 13, 1999, 41 years of history end as 
aerospace giant leaves.  From Internet www.gopbi.com/news/1999/08/13/pratt.html. 
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initiative starts bottom up or top down.  Clearly in this situation, the 
lack of sustained support from high levels of management and the 
union left local leadership to drive the program forward.   
 
Often local leadership would be caught unaware by higher-level 
decisions that did not take the local joint activities into account.  In 
addition, local leaders were trying to participate in the activities 
necessary for a successful implementation while doing their regular 
tasks.  An initiative as ambitious as this plan needed to have full time 
support from more people.  It did not fail because of the lack of 
dedicated resources and commitment, but it may have been more 
successful with them. 
 
The best plan in the world is worth little unless it is implemented.  In 
this facility, the plan was comprehensive.  The implementation 
process, however, was restrained by caution and the slow development 
of trust as well as huge frustrations over the deliberate pace of 
consensus decision-making.  These problems were exacerbated by a 
number of events over time that provided obstacles to the smooth 
progress of the plan such as periodic small layoffs, the introduction of 
production work, and the movement of engineers to Connecticut.  
Each of these actions might have been handled differently with high-
level support and buy-in for the initiative. 
 
Measures must be developed that reflect the effect that these initiatives 
have on organizations.  How to place a value on a partnership 
agreement to address critical issues such as skills and job redesign?  
Often the results of employee involvement are reflected in costly 
details that don’t occur because they have been avoided through 
employee actions.  The company cannot estimate how much cost was 
avoided by employee involvement nor can it estimate how much value 
was lost by restructuring.  These are critical puzzles that need to be 
solved before the full impact of joint initiatives can be appreciated. 
 
At a higher level, events in Florida and Connecticut point out a 
valuable insight.  The language that both locations implemented was 
similar but had distinctly different outcomes in each site.  Where the 
language was embedded in a more trusting and cooperative 
environment it led to greater collaboration and innovative behaviors.  
Employees began to feel as though their expertise and knowledge 
could make some positive improvements in their daily work as well as 
the firm’s future.   
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Appendix     
 
LETTER XXIX 
 
Mr. Frederick W. Thorpe, Jr., President 
Seminole Lodge 971 
International Association of Machinists 
   And Aerospace Workers 
P. O. Box 968 
Jupiter, FL 33468 
 
Dear Mr. Thorpe: 
 
This is to confirm the understanding and agreement reached in this 
contract negotiation between the company and Seminole Lodge 971, 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO, that both parties are committed to the continuation of improved 
relations to make GESP a site of choice for future work. 
 
We are both committed to the key goals of improved quality, 
employee development, productivity, employee participation, 
flexibility and the financial performance of the company while 
enhancing earning opportunities, long term employment, job 
satisfaction and safety for employees. 
 
In an effort to meet these commitments it is agreed to establish a joint 
CORE team consisting of the union president and the shop committee.  
Company representatives will include managers representing 
Assembly, Manufacturing, Quality, Facilities and Human Resources.  
Immediately after the ratification of this collective bargaining 
agreement the CORE team will begin to investigate mutually defined 
issues and initiatives intended to support the accomplishment of the 
goals of this agreement.  Costs directly associated with this joint 
initiative will be solely the responsibility of the company. 
 
The CORE team will focus on, but not be limited to, the following 
issues and initiatives.  To accomplish these tasks the CORE team will 
utilize sub-teams, made up of both company and union representatives, 
to work specific items at the discretion of the CORE team. 
 
·  Development of a WORK DESIGN plan for all hourly functions 
with focus on job flexibility by a target date of August 31, 1996 that is 
mutually agreeable to the company and the union. 
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·  Development of an hourly SKILLS DEVELOPMENT system that 
supports the Work Design Plan by a target date of September 30, 1996 
that is mutually agreeable to both the company and the union.  
 
·  Development of an hourly COMPENSATION system that supports 
the Work Design Plan by a target date of October 31, 1996 that is 
mutually agreeable to both the company and the union. 
 
·  Development of an hourly JOB PRESERVATION plan that supports 
the above items and is mutually agreeable to both the company and the 
union by a target date of November 30, 1996. 
 
·  It is agreed that no involuntary layoffs or reduction of wages shall 
occur as a direct result of the implementation of any joint initiatives. 
 
Very truly yours, 
PRATT & WHITNEY 
 
 
 
W. V. Panetta 
Vice President, Human Resources 
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Teaching Notes 
 
It is people who are at the heart of new work systems – establishing 
stability and then driving continuous improvement.  The Labor 
Aerospace Research Agenda (LARA) at MIT is committed to furthering 
our understanding of the human and institutional aspects of these new 
work systems, especially as they relate to broader issues of 
employment and vitality in the aerospace industry. 
 
These case studies were written by a MIT-based research team and 
were developed in conjunction with representatives from each of the 
sites with the help of representatives of the United Auto Workers and 
the International Association of Machinists. 
 
These case studies will be valuable to union leaders, labor educators, 
college professors and human resource trainers as well as anyone 
interested in discussing current dilemmas in the aerospace industry 
around employment.  These can be used in a classroom setting, in 
small discussion groups, or by individuals as thought starters.  This 
case study was prepared as an example of the challenges of instability 
in the aerospace industry.  It was written as a basis for dialogue and 
learning, not as an illustration of either effective or ineffective actions.  
There may be many possible answers to these questions.  They are 
designed to foster constructive dialogue and action on these very 
challenging issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
٠ What would e
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٠ What are limi
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d to succeed? 
t do you think the changing markets (declining 
g, increased competition, etc.) were the real drivers of 
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the closing of the jet engine side of the facility – as compared to 
organizational instability as the primary driver? 
 
٠ Given the difficulty in assessing the cost avoided by employee 
involvement or the value lost by restructuring, what does this case 
teach us about the challenges of valuing joint initiatives? 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Betty Barrett prepared this case with editorial design input from Susan 
Cass, John Verbos and other members of the LARA team.  This case 
study is an example of the challenges of instability in the aerospace 
industry and was written as a basis for dialogue and learning – not as 
an illustration of either effective or ineffective action. 
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